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The common law arbitrator, like the common law judge, follows a little and leads a little. 1
Employees are using new technologies. They are using GPS, electronic mail,
the Internet, cell phones and other handheld devices, blogs, Twitter, texting and
social networking sites. They are using new technologies while at the workplace and
while away from the workplace, while working and while engaging in personal
pursuits. They may be using the technologies appropriately or to the detriment of
their employers. Employers are also using new technologies. They are monitoring
their employees, both in the workplace and away from it. They too may be doing so
appropriately, or they may be doing so in a manner invasive of their employees‘
privacy or dignity.
Needless to say, the use of these new technologies gives rise to employment
disputes that differ in kind from those of times past. Many scholars have written
about the failure of the law to keep pace with the workplace changes brought about
by new technologies. Many have also written about the failure of the federal and
state statutory laws and of the common law to systematically and sensibly resolve
employment disputes arising out of the use of new technologies. But one place that
disputes arising out of new technologies are being grappled with in a systemic
manner, and handled in a relatively sensible manner, is by arbitrators in the union
sector.
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prior work in the area. 2 Section I provides an introduction to the article. Section II
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V focuses on cases involving new technologies that have arisen under provisions of
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The use of new technologies, such as GPS, electronic mail, the Internet, cell
phones and other handheld devices, blogs, Twitter, texting, and social networking
sites in the workplace, and outside of it, often gives rise to disputes and grievances. 3
While the grievances may be similar in type to those of times past, such as a
challenge to discipline for lack of just cause, they raise modern day issues about the
blurring of boundaries between work and private life, security of information in a
world where an inadvertent press of a button can transfer large amounts of
confidential data, and the role of the law in addressing the use of technology.
This article surveys the types of issues being arbitrated, the criteria arbitrators
use to decide the cases, and the outcomes of the cases. It builds on and updates my
prior work in the area. 4 Section II provides an overview of my research. Section III
addresses the types of cases involving new technologies arising as challenges to
discipline for lack of just cause. Section IV addresses the related issue of employer
monitoring of employees. Section V focuses on cases involving new technologies
that have arisen under provisions of the collective bargaining agreement other than a
just cause provision.

Of 34 respondents to our survey, 18 (53%) reported involvement in a grievance or arbitration about
the use of modern technology. The technologies involved included e-mail, electronic imaging, GPS,
Internet, dashboard cameras, smart phones, webcams, social networking sites, and blogs.
3

Ariana R. Levinson, Industrial Justice: Privacy Protection for the Employed, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y
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OVERVIEW OF R ESEARCH

I recently surveyed approximately 400 arbitration decisions addressing GPS,
e-mail, blogging, and the Internet located in the Bureau of National Affairs‘ labor
arbitration decisions database dating from 1999 to 2007. 5 Of these, I reviewed sixtyeight more closely in order to discern the manner in which arbitrators are dealing
with the issues of privacy arising out of the use of technology in, or outside, the
workplace. 6
Fifty-nine cases involved a grievant challenging discipline under a just cause
provision.7 In 36 of those cases, the arbitrator overturned or reduced the discipline
imposed by the employer.8 Eight of the cases involved a union alleging violations of
some other type of contractual provision or of past-practice.9 The arbitrators in six
of those cases upheld the grievance, at least in part. 10 The remaining case was an
interest arbitration.11 The arbitrator in that case rejected the union‘s proposal that
the employees perform routine maintenance on their assigned computers. 12 Twentytwo of the cases explicitly addressed employees‘ privacy concerns. 13
To write this article, I updated the research, with help from my research
assistant. We focused on any issues raised by new technologies, rather than primarily
on privacy issues. In this article I thus include 24 additional cases in which the
decision was issued from 2006 to 2009. Of these cases, 20 involved a grievant
challenging discipline for lack of just cause. The grievance was sustained, at least in
part, in 15 of the cases. The grievance was denied in six. Four of the cases involved
union grievances over some other provision in the collective bargaining agreement.
In three of these cases, the grievance was denied, and, in one, it was sustained.

5

Levinson, supra note 4, at 637.
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ISSUES IN JUST CAUSE CASES

Many of the arbitration cases challenging just cause for discipline raise the
issue of whether an employee used technology in an inappropriate way or must be
disciplined due to the use of technology outside of the workplace. This section first
addresses the types of misuse that occur relating to on-duty activity. It then
addresses the impact of technology outside of the workplace. Finally, it addresses
the critical issue in all cases of the quality or reliability of the evidence produced by
new technologies.
A.

Workplace Technology

This sub-section addresses the issue of discipline for inappropriate use of
technology in the workplace. It includes a discussion of the following types of cases:
employees using employer-issued technology for personal use in violation of a
prohibition on personal use; employees using employer-issued technology for
personal use during non-break time; employees engaging in excessive personal use of
employer-issued technology; employees using employer-issued technology for
unlawful purposes; employees violating rules prohibiting racially or sexually offensive
communications; employees using proprietary information for personal reasons; and
employees using employer-issued technology to make statements disrespectful of the
employer.
1.

Violation of Rules Prohibiting Personal Use of Company
Computers and Other Devices

Arbitrators generally uphold rules prohibiting personal use of company
computers and other devices provided they are enforced and progressive discipline is
followed. Several uphold discipline for violation of an enforced rule that provides
for no personal use of company-issued computers. For instance, in one case the
arbitrator held that as long as the rule is consistently enforced, an employer may
appropriately preclude employees from using the computer and e-mail system for
personal reasons, including exchanging recipes with co-workers.14
In another case, the employer had a rule prohibiting use of company
equipment ―for other than company business without authorization.‖ 15 A human
14

See Conneaut Sch. Dist., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 909, 914 (1995) (Talarico, Arb.).

15

Kuhlman Elec. Corp., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 257, 258 (2006) (Nicholas, Arb.).
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resources manager found personal e-mail addressed to the grievant on her printer on
two occasions, and she also found a printout of a webpage addressed to the
grievant. 16 After further investigation, the grievant was terminated for personal use
of the computer system, as well as for other things.17 The arbitrator held that
discipline for violation of the rule was warranted, although the discipline was reduced
for other reasons. 18
In a third case, a police officer was suspended for using his employer-issued
computer during work time to work for a trailer fabrication business that he owned
with his brother.19 The arbitrator held that the employer had ―just cause to discipline
the [g]rievant for misuse of [employer] property when he intentionally used such
property for personal benefit, without authorization, to produce designs, schematics,
and related business documents for his business while at work.‖ 20 The arbitrator did,
however, reduce the suspension from 40 to 24 hours due to his long record of
service without significant discipline.21
A number of cases, however, have held that failure to enforce a rule
prohibiting personal use will cause disciplinary action based on such a rule to fail or
be reduced. For example, in one case, the arbitrator held that a past practice of
permitting use of e-mail for non-business related activity ―completely negated‖ the
employer‘s written policy to the contrary. 22 In another case, where a grievant in a
non-union setting sent his newsletter via e-mail, ―the past practice of the Employer
that allowed, over a ten year period, the publication of the offending newsletter lulled
the Grievant in to a false sense of security.‖ 23 In a third case, the employer permitted
an internal, non-Internet, communication system designed for use in emergencies to
be utilized to notify employees when ―muffins were being delivered to the office.‖ 24
The arbitrator held that the non-emergency use mitigated the level of discipline of an
16

Id. at 258.

17

Id. at 259.

18

Id. at 262.

19

City of El Paso, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 691-92 (2006) (Greer, Arb.).

20

Id. at 696.

21

Id.

22

Chevron Prods. Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 271, 275 (2001) (Goodstein, Arb.).

23

AlliedSignal Engines, 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 614, 624 (1996) (Rivera, Arb).

24

Co. of Sacramento, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 699, 701 (2003) (Riker, Arb.).
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employee who used the system to send sexually explicit messages to a co-worker.25
In another recent case, an arbitrator held that misuse of a company-issued computer
for personal gain would not justify discharge when three others who had committed
similar misconduct had not been terminated.26 But, the discharge was upheld due to
additional infractions.27
Finally, in another recent case, the grievant was discharged for, among other
things, using an employer-issued cell phone for personal calls.28 The employer‘s
policy provided that the phones could be used only when absolutely necessary, and
that the employee must reimburse the employer for any personal calls, even if the
call did not add expense because the calls for the month were within the monthly
minimum.29 The arbitrator reviewed the cell-phone records.30 He found that the
grievant did not make calls daily, that the calls were generally only one or two
minutes long and often near the end of the workday, and that, with only one
exception, the calls did not result in extra cost to the employer.31 The exception was
a ―call to England to check on her mother who had a stroke.‖ 32 The parties disputed
whether the grievant had paid for that call.33 The arbitrator held that discipline was
an inappropriate response and only counseling or an oral warning was warranted.34
The arbitrator reasoned that ―[w]hatever its stated policy,‖ as a practical matter, the
employer ―expect[s] reimbursement only when the personal usage results in an
additional charge.‖35

25

Id. at 701.

See State of Ohio Rehab. Serv. Comm‘n., 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1509, 1517 (2008) (Murphy,
Arb.).
26

27

Id. at 1518.

28

Clatsop County, 126 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 620, 622 (2009) (Reeves, Arb.).

29

Id. at 634.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 635.

35

Id.
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Personal Use during Non-Break Time

Several decisions suggest that personal use of computers can be limited to
break time. 36 For instance, in one case, the arbitrator found that it was appropriate
to admonish a union representative for using the e-mail system during his work time
to notify other members of a union meeting without first seeking the permission of
management. 37 The arbitrator reasoned that the representative could not have been
on his 15-minute break at the time of day that he sent the e-mail.38
Another decision also upheld limiting Internet use to break time. The
grievant‘s supervisor saw him access the Internet for what appeared to be nonbusiness reasons several times. 39 She also saw him call over other employees to view
his computer screen and announce breaking news. 40 The supervisor requested an
audit of the grievant‘s computer use. The audit disclosed that the grievant was
repeatedly using the computer during work time for non-business related purposes,
such as accessing websites such as Ticketmaster, weather.com, the St. Petersburg
Times, and USA jobs. 41 The arbitrator found that personal use could reasonably be
limited to break times because intermittent viewing of websites would ―be disruptive
and inefficient as to productivity.‖ 42 As a result it would likely adversely affect the
employee‘s work performance, as the arbitrator found it had in the case. 43
3.

Excessive Computer Use

Arbitration decisions suggest that employers have a legitimate business
interest in ensuring that excessive personal computer use does not result in
interference with successful job performance. 44 For example, in one case, a campus
36

Levinson, supra note 4, at 666.

37

Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1543, 1545 (2003) (Oberdank, Arb.).

38

Id. at 1546.

39

Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs, 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 106, 108 (2006) (Hoffman, Arb.).

40

Id.

41

Id. at 109, n.3.

42

Id. at 111.

43

Id.

Levinson, supra note 4, at 666. Cf. Univ. of Mich., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1394, 1401 (2000)
(Sugerman, Arb.) (upholding directive not to make personal calls while on break because excessive
calls were interfering with employee‘s job performance).
44
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police officer self-reported his work time, yet computer records revealed that he had
been using another employee‘s computer during the time he was self-reporting the
completion of checking the premise of one facility. 45 The arbitrator upheld his
termination, because the amount of time spent on the computer indicated that it
would have been impossible for him to have completed the necessary premise check,
thus leaving the premise unchecked and unsecured. 46
And at least one arbitration decision has upheld discipline for apparent
excessive personal use of a computer even when there was no evidence that the use
interfered with the quality of the employee‘s work. 47 Co-workers testified that they
observed the grievant using the computer for personal reasons, and the decision
upheld a 24 hour suspension for ―occasional to frequent‖ use of the work computer
for the employee‘s ―personal metal fabrication business.‖ 48
Yet other decisions indicate that arbitrators will reduce the level of discipline
imposed when the excessive use does not actually interfere with the employee‘s
satisfactory performance. For instance, in one recent case, a high school teacher was
terminated for failure to teach and for excessive use of the computer for prohibited
reasons during instructional time.49 The school district‘s technology use policy
prohibited use ―for personal commercial activity,‖ but allowed ―reasonable personal
use.‖ 50 After several parents, students, and teachers complained to the associate
principal that the grievant was ―spending an inordinate amount of time on the
Internet rather than instructing,‖ the assistant principal observed the grievant
minimize his computer screen several times when the assistant principal entered the
room.51
The assistant principal, thus, asked the technology coordinator to review the
grievant‘s computer use. 52 When she reported that the grievant ―had visited
45

Univ. of Chicago, 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 88, 95 (2004) (Briggs, Arb.).

Id. at 95-96; see also Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1043, 1048, 1053
(2001) (Cohen, Arb.) (upholding termination for, among other reasons, using computer for non-work
reasons for six to eight hours a week during work-time).
46

47

City of El Paso, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 691, 695 (2006) (Greer, Arb.).

48

Id. at 694-96.

49

Indep. Sch. Dist. #284, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 257, 258-59 (2008) (Daly, Arb.).

50

Id. at 261.

51

Id.

52

Id.
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numerous Internet sites that were unrelated to his teaching assignments,‖ the
district-wide technology coordinator captured ―a full report of websites and URL
hits from‖ the grievant‘s computer during the past month using a recently
implemented Internet monitoring system. 53 According to the report, the grievant‘s
computer ―had logged approximately 55,000 URL hits over the course of the 20workday period.‖ 54 The report filled an entire banker‘s box. 55 Many of the hits were
to an on-line auction website, where 29 bids were made by the user of grievant‘s
computer, and others were to eBay.56 ―The amount of time spent . . . on shopping
sites was 18 hours 17 minutes and 40 seconds . . . .‖57 Both an employer and a union
computer forensic expert testified that banner ads and pop-ups can generate nonuser initiated ―hits,‖ and that while on a particular site, additional ―hits‖ can be
generated even when no one is clicking the mouse. 58
The arbitrator reasoned that the report did not accurately convey actual
computer use due to activity other than clicking on the mouse generating ―hits.‖59
The arbitrator advised that the grievant should better supervise his students. 60 But
the arbitrator concluded that the grievant had not ―so utterly misused the computer
that he failed to teach his students and willfully neglected his duties.‖ 61 The
arbitrator, thus, reduced the termination to a long-term suspension without pay.62
In another case, the grievant, a fire-fighter, was discharged for using the
employer‘s e-mail system extensively for personal messages and for the sexual
content of those messages, among other things.63 The arbitrator held that lesser
discipline should have been imposed. 64 The arbitrator reasoned that the messages
53

Id.

54

Id. at 262.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 264.

59

See id. at 266.

60

See id.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

City of Quincy, 126 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 767, 771 (2008) (Finkin, Arb.).

64

Id. at 773.
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were not pornographic or unwelcome, but rather many were ―adolescent dilations on
love and longing,‖ and some were ‗―sexually oriented‖‘ but of a routine type for
―‗contemporary American popular culture in all its sex-saturated vulgarity.‘‖ 65 The
arbitrator further reasoned that the e-mails were sent only to one person, his lover,
and that there was no evidence presented of neglect of duty.66 The arbitrator
reasoned that lesser discipline would have effectively corrected the problem. 67
4.

Unlawful Use

An employer is able to prohibit employees from using computers for
unlawful purposes and to discipline them for so doing. For example, in one case an
arbitrator upheld an employee‘s termination for downloading child pornography in
violation of a company rule. 68
While other instances of employee‘s use of employer‘s equipment in unlawful
ways have not been reported, using employer‘s technology to defame someone 69 or
in a way that amounts to sexual harassment under Title VII would likely also justify
termination.
5.

Racial or Sexually Offensive Communications

Arbitrators generally find rules prohibiting racially or sexually offensive
communications reasonable. 70 For example, in one case, the arbitrator upheld the
termination of an employee who sent racially offensive language to a ―chat room.‖ 71
Similarly, in a different case, the decision upheld a five-day suspension for an
employee who viewed sexually explicit web pages on an employer‘s computer while
off-duty.72 Finally, in a third case, the arbitrator upheld a discharge because the
65

Id. at 772 (quoting Baskerville v. Culligan Int‘l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995)).

66

See id. at 773.

67

Id.

68

Xcel Energy, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 26, 34 (2003) (Daly, Arb.).

See Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1299, 1301 (2005) (Suntrup, Arb.) (noting
a policy that forbids electronic communications that are defamatory).
69

Three of 11 survey respondents reported involvement in a case where an employee accessed
pornography.
70

71

MT Detroit, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1777, 1779, 1782 (2003) (Allen, Arb.).

72

U.S. Dept. of Agric., 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1212, 1216 (2003) (Cook, Arb.).
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employee had viewed more violent and disturbing pornography than other
employees who had not been discharged.73
Some level of discipline will be upheld even when the conduct involved does
not arise to the level of legal harassment. For instance, in one case, the decision
upheld a suspension for e-mailing a calendar that was offensive.74 Certain pictures
violated the employer‘s equal opportunity policies, which were more prohibitive than
required by law.75 In another recent case, the decision reasoned that transmitting an
e-mail with an attachment of five photos of a nude male with tattooed genitalia that
offended a co-worker violated company policy.76 But the arbitrator reduced the
discipline because the grievant was not watching a pornographic film, did not
compromise the computer system by accessing a public website, and did not engage
in external communications. 77 While the e-mail offended one co-worker, ―it was not
a significant event in the workplace that resulted in loss or other harm.‖ 78 Thus, in
light of the employee‘s longevity, the termination was reduced. 79
But some arbitration decisions will reduce the discipline imposed when the
communication was completely private and without ability to offend another. 80 In
one well cited case, the arbitration decision reduced the penalty from discharge to a
decision-making leave. 81 Although it violated reasonable work rules to view
pornography on the Internet, the grievant‘s private viewing of pornography when no
one else was present was not threatening or harassing and did not violate laws or
73

State of Minn., 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1569, 1573 (2002) (Neigh, Arb.).

74

S. Cal. Edison, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1066, 1072 (2002) (Prayzich, Arb.).

Id. See also PPG Indus., Inc., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 833, 842 (1999) (Dichter, Arb.) (concluding
that sexual jokes sent to employees who did not take offense nevertheless violated employer‘s sexual
harassment policy).
75

76

Am. Red Cross, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1696, 1703, 1714-15 (2008) (Ruben, Arb.).

77

Id. at 1715.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 1715-16.

City of Fort Worth, Tex., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1125, 1130 (2007) (Moore, Arb.) (considering that
employee did not disseminate e-mails as important in decision to reinstate employee with back pay);
Snohomish Co. [Wash.] Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1, 8 (2000) (Levak, Arb.)
(―penalty of discharge was far too severe‖ when employee stopped sending inappropriate e-mails after
receiving warning of potential termination, and e-mails were sent only to his own home e-mail
address).
80

81

Ga. Power Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 936, 948 (2006) (Nolan, Arb.).
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create liability.82 Thus, the arbitrator reduced the penalty even though the grievant
knew that viewing the content was prohibited, the grievant knew that the company
would monitor electronic communications, and the grievant knew that he could be
disciplined and possibly discharged.83 Additionally, the company consistently
enforced a policy of monitoring for attempts to access inappropriate sites and
instituted an investigation of all computer use for all employees who attempted to
access 20 or more inappropriate sites in one month. 84
Some arbitrators also reduce the discipline imposed when the
communication was shared with only a few other individuals or shared only with
friends. For instance, in one case, the grievant sent ―arguably sexually explicit and
offensive e-mails to only three close friends none of whom would be offended.‖85
The arbitrator considered the limited dispersal to friends in deciding to reduce the
termination to a suspension. 86
Recently, at least one arbitrator significantly reduced the discipline imposed
when offensive material was only accidently viewed by co-workers.87 The employer
limited personal use of its computers, prohibited accessing sexually explicit websites,
and prohibited ―objectionable language.‖ 88 A supervisor found four pages of bigoted
and ―uniformly disgusting‖ material that the grievant printed jammed in the printer.89
The grievant was suspended for 20 days.90 The arbitrator noted that ―chatting at the
water cooler has now been replaced with time wasted surfing the Internet‖ and that
―the Internet is populated by an abundance of gross and discriminatory refuse, the
price we pay for the free marketplace of ideas.‖ 91 The arbitrator reduced the

82

Id. at 947.

83

Id.

84

Id. at 938.

Levinson, supra note 4, at 676 n.392 (citing Chevron Prods. Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 271,
274, 280-81 (2001) (Goodstein, Arb.)).
85

86

Chevron Prods. Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 271, 274, 280-81 (2001) (Goodstein, Arb.).

87

City of Fort Lauderdale, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1249, 1254 (2008) (Abrams, Arb.).

88

Id. at 1249.

89

Id.

90

Id. at 1249.

91

Id. at 1252-53.
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discipline to a five-day suspension, reasoning that no evidence indicated that the
grievant intended to make the offensive material available to other employees.92
As with a rule generally prohibiting personal communications, a rule
prohibiting pornography or sexually or racially offensive communications must be
consistently enforced in order to justify discipline. For instance, one decision found
that because employees, including supervisors, routinely used the computer system
to send e-mail for non-business related activities, including sending sexually related
jokes, a company‘s policy forbidding such use was ―completely negated.‖ 93 The
arbitrator reasoned that failing to monitor for prohibited use and instead relying only
on complaints of inappropriate use meant that employees ―have a right to believe
that what they are doing has been condoned by the Company.‖ 94 The arbitrator
suggested that ―by spot checking the e-mail messages sent over the Company
computers, from time to time, the Company could determine whether anyone was
violating the Company‘s e-mail Policy.‖95 The grievant‘s termination was reduced to
a three-day suspension. 96
In another case, a decision found no just cause for the grievant‘s termination.
Supervisors had ―on a regular basis knowingly tolerated, condoned and joined‖ in
sending e-mails which were inappropriate per a written policy.97 The arbitrator
reasoned that lax enforcement lulls employees into ―a false sense of security.‖ 98
Similarly, as with most rules, arbitrators find notice of the rule prohibiting
offensive communications important. For instance, one decision upheld a
suspension for circulating an offensive calendar via e-mail where the employee was
on notice of a detailed and comprehensive equal opportunity policy that prohibited
derogatory pictures and suggestive calendar displays. 99

92

Id. at 1254.

93

Chevron Prods. Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 271, 272 (Goodstein, Arb.).

94

Id. at 275.

95

Id. at 279.

96

Id. at 281.

97

Snohomish County, 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1, 7, (2000) (Levak, Arb.).
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Id. at 7.
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S. Cal. Edison, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1066, 1071-72 (2002) (Prayzich, Arb.).
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Additionally, some arbitrators find no just cause to discipline an employee
for receipt of inappropriate and sexually explicit e-mails, or for receipt of ―earthy,
candid, and disgusting‖ e-mails.100 In such cases, the employee does not generate the
pictures and does not disseminate them. Moreover, as the arbitrator in one case
reasoned, ―[w]hat may be one individual‘s art may be another‘s pornography.‖ 101
6.

Proprietary Company Information

Arbitration decisions hold that employers reasonably prohibit use of
proprietary company databases for personal reasons. For example, one arbitrator
imposed a one-day suspension on a deputy sheriff who ran acquaintances‘ names
through a law enforcement database containing motor vehicle and warrant
information.102 In another case, an employee checked a social services database to
verify that a complaint of child neglect had been filed against her, and the arbitrator
imposed a suspension. 103
7.

Disrespectful Communications

At least one arbitrator upheld the discharge of an employee who engaged in
sending a disrespectful e-mail as well as making verbal threats against management.
The e-mail, to all those with whom he worked, stated the employee had ―continued
to tolerate the abuse and micro management of the Comptroller‘s shop.‖ 104
Another arbitrator held, however, that a disrespectful e-mail sent as a
protected concerted activity could not serve as the basis of discipline.105 In this case,
the grievant, a school teacher, received a written reprimand for, among other things,
sending an e-mail that arguably ―ridiculed and showed disrespect for building
City of Fort Worth, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1125, 1129-30 (2007) (Moore, Arb.); see also
Monterey County, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 897, 899-900 (2002) (Levy, Arb.).
100

101

City of Fort Worth, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1129.

102

Franklin County Sheriff‘s Office, 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 654, 660-63 (2007) (Bell, Arb.).

103

Mont. Child & Family Serv., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 656, 662 (2006) (Reeves, Arb.).

Marine Corps Air Ground Command Ctr., 111 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 161, 162 (1998) (Gentile,
Arb.).
104

One survey respondent reported involvement in a case where the issue was whether the grievant‘s
use of the school employer‘s e-mail system ―to solicit comments about the employer was protected
speech under Ohio law.‖ Based on the comparison of facts and information, it appears this
respondent was involved in the Sycamore Board of Education case discussed infra.
105
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administrators and the safety policies they sought to enforce.‖ 106 The arbitrator
reasoned that the grievant sent the e-mail in his role as union representative and for
the purpose of concerted activity. Specifically, the arbitrator reasoned that although
the e-mail was ―self-serving,‖ ―unprofessional,‖ ―disrespectful,‖ ―belittling of
building administrators,‖ and used inappropriate racially charged language, 107 it was a
protected message seeking information necessary to adjust a grievance. It did not
contain unlawful content or violate the contract, and thus could not serve as the
basis of discipline.108
B.

Technology Used Off-Duty

As we all realize and as stated by one arbitrator, ―[a]s a general rule, once an
employee is off duty and away from the workplace, there is a presumption that the
employee‘s private life is beyond the employer‘s control.‖ 109 As a result, the number
of cases relating to new technologies and discipline for off-duty behavior are fewer
than those relating to on-duty behavior. Yet there are some, as would be expected,
due to the blurring of the boundaries between work and personal life occurring due
to the rise of new technologies.
There are several types of off-duty conduct involving new technology that
arbitrators generally find result in the ―direct nexus‖110 justifying discipline. First,
arbitrators encounter cases involving employees competing with their employers.
For example, in one case, an arbitrator upheld a termination in part based on an
employee‘s e-mail soliciting business from a company that the grievant‘s employer
was also soliciting.111 In another, the arbitrator upheld the termination of an
employee who had set up an Internet website and purchased equipment to establish
a directly competing business.112

106

Sycamore Bd. of Educ., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1588, 1596 (2007) (Van Pelt, Arb.).

107

Id. at 1600.

108

Id.

109

Dep‘t. of Corr. Servs., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1533, 1536 (1997) (Simmelkjaer, Arb.).

Quaker Oats Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 211, 212, 215 (2001) (Marino, Arb.). By ―direct
nexus‖ arbitrators mean the type of significant concrete harm to the employer that justifies discipline.
110

111

GFC Crane Consultants, Inc., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 801, 804 (2006) (Abrams, Arb.).

112

Fox Television Station, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 641, 645 (2003) (Allen, Arb.).
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Second, arbitrators encounter cases where a role model engages in immoral
or obscene conduct, drawing attention from those in the workplace and the
community.113 For example, in one case, the grievant, a school teacher, was
terminated when his estranged wife posted obscene nude photos of him on MySpace
and two other websites, in conjunction with ―gross‖ write-ups.114 Co-workers,
children, parents, the local newspaper, and the community became aware of the
photos. At least one child called a teacher in tears. The arbitrator reasoned that in
such circumstances, an employee has some responsibility to keep off-duty conduct
private from those in the workplace. The arbitrator reasoned that the grievant had
been warned that his wife would likely make the photos publicly available, but failed
to take measures to prevent her from doing it. The decision, thus, upheld the
termination.115
In another recent case, an elementary school teacher was terminated for
appearing nude on pornographic websites. 116 The superintendent received an
anonymous package in the mail with a statement from concerned parents and
printouts from the websites.117 The arbitrator upheld the termination, reasoning that
―teachers and other school employees often are held to a ‗heightened scrutiny‘ of
their personal lives because of the important role they fill as educators and caretakers
of children.‖118
Yet, in another case, an arbitrator stated that he could not uphold a
termination where a teacher engaged in conduct that caused disruption to students
and the community.119 The teacher went to a festival that was generally known as a
―rowdy occasion‖ with ―public sexual activity.‖120 Her group decided to participate
in performing fellatio and cunnilingus on mannequins in exchange for a shot of
liquor. While the teacher was participating, she was photographed, and someone
See also Cedarburg Educ. Ass‘n v. Cedarburg Bd. of Educ., 756 N.W.2d 809 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008)
(upholding refusal to enforce arbitration decision reinstating teacher who used school computer to
view adult images on public policy grounds).
113

114

Warren City Bd. of Educ., 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 532, 535 (2007) (Skulina, Arb.).

115

Id. at 536.

116

Phenix City Bd. of Educ., 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1473 (2009) (Baroni, Arb.).

117

Id. at 1473.

118

Id. at 1476.

119

L‘Anse Creuse Pub. Schs., 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 527 (2008) (Daniel, Arb.).

120

Id. at 527.
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posted the photos on a publicly available website, causing a commotion with the
students, parents, and community. The employer, thus, placed the grievant on
administrative leave. The arbitrator stated, ―[h]ere the grievant was involved in an
acknowledged adult activity of a salacious nature, however it did not directly involve
either the school or her capacity to teach. For this reason, the arbitrator must find
that the employer would not have had just cause for terminating her employment or
otherwise disciplining her.‖ 121 But the arbitrator did hold that the paid administrative
leave was appropriate because her outside activity ―had carried over into the school
community,‖ and thus she should not be teaching until the matter was resolved.122
Third, several cases address situations where off-duty conduct involves an
employee‘s relationship with co-workers. In one case, a police officer sent a racially
―vile and repugnant ‗joke‘‖ via text message from his personal cell phone to a
number of individuals, including a black co-worker.123 The decision found that the
grievant inadvertently forwarded the message either because he intended to send it to
someone else, or because he experienced a problem when purging his text message
inbox. As soon as the grievant learned he had sent the message to the co-worker, he
apologized and asked to be forgiven. 124 Nevertheless, the decision found that the
grievant brought discredit to him and the department because, inadvertently or not,
he forwarded the message to two co-workers, and such racist attitudes were
unacceptable. 125 The arbitrators, however, reduced the grievant‘s termination to a
21-day suspension. 126 They did so because the message was sent inadvertently, there
was no evidence that any other employee was terminated for comparable conduct,
and the grievant had a commendable record. 127
Another arbitrator upheld the termination of an employee who used his work
computer to exchange sexually oriented messages with the wife of one of his
subordinates.128 While the e-mails were exchanged while on duty, the arbitrator
121

Id. at 530.

122

Id.

123

WMATA/Metro, 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 972, 976 (2007) (Evans, Arb.).

124

Id. at 977.

125

Id.

126

Id. at 978.

127

Id.

128

City of Quincy, 126 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 534 (2008) (Finkin, Arb.).
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focused on the personal nature of the relationship, analogizing to off-duty conduct
cases.129 The arbitrator stated the applicable principle as follows: ―[i]t is a
fundamental principle of workplace justice that an employee‘s private life is none of
the employer‘s concern save in those instances where there is a demonstrable
deleterious impact in the workplace.‖ 130 The arbitrator reasoned that the relationship
negatively impacted the workplace because the husband of the woman was unable to
work with the grievant, and no schedule could permit them not to work together. 131
Fourth, at least one decision addresses a situation where an employee uses
technology outside of the workplace to publicly criticize the employer. The
arbitrator upheld a suspension for, among other things, posting a rap song on a
union website.132 The grievant, a firefighter paramedic, was the union vice-president,
and was being investigated by the fire department for various reasons. While
working, he and a colleague wrote some lyrics protesting the investigation. Then,
while off-duty, they turned the lyrics into a rap song that demeaned the fire
department and the police department and posted it on the union website. The
arbitrator reasoned that an employee is not ―free to criticize publicly his employer
over employment matters‖ in such circumstances. 133 Such public criticism might
adversely affect the ―internal harmony of a fire department.‖ 134
Fifth, at least one arbitrator encountered a case where the company claimed
its reputation was damaged by criminal conduct of a non-role-model employee made
available to the community. In the case, an employee of the Coc a-Cola Bottling Co.
was convicted as a sex offender and registered as such on a state website.135 The
arbitrator reasoned that the company had a reputation as an ―all-American‖ and
―wholesome‖ company and that the public, customers, and co-workers could all be
expected to object to the unsupervised delivery of products by the grievant. 136 The
129

Id. at 539.

130

Id. at 538.

131

Id. at 539.

132

Union Twp. Bd. of Trs., 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1638 (2008) (Rosen, Arb.).

133

Id. at 1658.

134

Id.

The Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ohio/Ky. Dayton Sales Ctr., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1489, 1498
(2005) (Paolucci, Arb.).
135

136

Id. at 1494, 1498.
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arbitrator concluded that ―[t]he type of crime is serious enough and its
unacceptability to the public significant enough to justify the Grievant‘s
termination.‖137
Finally, one case demonstrates that the generally applicable rule that ―the
employee‘s private life is beyond the employer‘s control‖138 applies equally to cases
involving technology. In this case, the grievant, a sheriff‘s deputy, attended a dance
bar, and the bar posted a photo of the grievant dancing on its website.139 The
grievant called in late to work the next morning.140 Management inquired about her
reasons for being late, and she asserted that her power had gone out and her alarm
clock had failed to ring.141 Management, having viewed the bar‘s publicly available
web page and believing that her late night caused her tardiness, terminated her for
lying about the reasons she was tardy.142 The arbitrator reasoned that officers were
not required to report reasons for tardiness and that she could attend a bar during
her off-duty time if she so chose.143 The arbitrator, thus, sustained the grievance. 144
C.

Quality of the Evidence

Regardless of the type of case, new technologies raise issues about the
reliability of the evidence that they produce. Arbitrators generally recognize that
they must consider the quality of the photo or report to determine whether it is
reliable.145 Additionally, arbitrators generally consider the photos or records in light
of the other evidence.146 For instance, in one case, GPS reports did not establish a
timeline of the grievant‘s day, but they did sufficiently establish a conflict between
the time logged by the grievant as spent at customer‘s premises and the time actually

137

Id. at 1498.

138

Dep‘t. of Corr. Servs., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1533, 1536 (1997) (Simmelkjaer, Arb).

139

Shawnee County, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1659, 1661 (2007) (Daly, Arb.).

140

Id. at 1661-62.

141

Id. at 1662.

142

Id. at 1663.

143

Id. at 1664.

144

Id.

145

Levinson, supra note 4, at 656.

146

Id.
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spent there.147 In another case, ―grainy‖ black-and-white photos were insufficient
standing alone to prove the grievant had been smoking in violation of company
policy.148 But alongside management‘s credible testimony that the grievant had
confessed, they were sufficient to uphold the discipline. 149 On the other hand, in one
case, management asserted that the grievant had been masturbating on the job. 150
The arbitrator held that video photographs did not prove this in light of the
grievant‘s credible testimony to the contrary that he was cleaning a boil. 151
When dealing with computers, the quality of the record evidence can be too
complicated for the arbitrator to assess without aid and may require the testimony of
experts.152 In one case the employer, accompanied by an IBM technician, discovered
18 ―images depicting child pornography which were located in temporary Internet
files‖ on the grievant‘s company-issued computer. 153 The employer reported the
discovery to the police, which confiscated the computers to which the grievant had
access.154 The grievant stated that he had no knowledge of the images, volunteering
―that it may have been attached to an unsolicited e-mail or was a ‗pop-up.‘‖ 155 But
the employer, nevertheless, suspended him with intent to terminate him. At the
hearing, ―[e]xpert witnesses credibly explained that files, including unwanted files, are
frequently created on computers in normal operation.‖ 156 The arbitrator reasoned
that if the grievant did not knowingly or intentionally engage in the misconduct, he
could not be penalized for it.157 The arbitrator also relied on the findings of the state
trooper who examined the hard drive and determined that the images could have

147Embarq,

123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 923, 930-31 (2007) (Armedariz, Arb.).

148

Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 949, 951 (2006) (Coyne, Arb).

149

Id.

150

Kuhlman Elec. Corp., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 257, 262 (2006) (Nicholas, Arb.).

151

Id.

See e.g., Indep. Sch. Dist. #284, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. 257, 264 (BNA) (2008) (Daly, Arb.) (computer
forensic experts testified about generation of Internet hits by pop-ups and automatically refreshing
web pages).
152

153

AK Steel, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 903, 904 (2008) (Dean, Arb.).
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Id.
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Id.

156

Id. at 908.

157

Id.
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been accidentally stored.158 The arbitrator reasoned that the employer had
overlooked that exculpatory evidence when deciding to discharge the grievant. 159
For these reasons, the arbitrator sustained the grievance. 160
IV.

EMPLOYER MONITORING OF EMPLOYEES

Another issue raised by the just cause cases and some cases brought under
other types of provisions is whether employer technological monitoring of
employees is appropriate and, if so, in what circumstances and with what safeguards.
This section addresses cases discussing monitoring of on-duty actions, whether
employees have any right to privacy in on-duty communications, monitoring of onduty communications, monitoring of off-duty conduct, monitoring the employer‘s
property when it is located on the employee‘s property, and negotiating over
institution of technological monitoring.
A.

Monitoring On-Duty Actions

As in many discipline cases, notice is one important factor that arbitrators
consider when deciding whether to uphold discipline for an infraction discovered via
technological monitoring, such as by GPS. 161 Two cases involving monitoring by
GPS illustrate how notice to the employee that the behavior is an infraction can be
critical in determining whether to uphold the imposed discipline. 162 In both cases the
employees were well aware that the employer was monitoring them via GPS. 163 In
the first case, the employee was disciplined for driving an employer-owned vehicle to
his home for lunch. 164 The arbitrator overturned a 24-hour suspension because no
policy prohibited the employee from driving an employer-owned vehicle to his home
for lunch.165 On the other hand, in the second case, GPS records disclosed that an
158

Id. at 909.

159

Id. at 910.

160

Id. at 911.

Levinson, supra note 4, at 651. One survey respondent reported involvement with a case where
GPS was used in determining whether a truck driver deviated from his route.
161

162

Id. at 651.

163

Id. at 651-52.

164

Orange Co., Fla. 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 460, 463 (2007) (Smith, Arb.).

165

Id. at 465.
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employee had misrepresented the amount of time he spent working at customer
sites.166 The employer had previously warned the grievant about falsifying time
records; thus, primarily for this reason, the arbitrator upheld the discipline. 167
The cases suggest that arbitrators are all over the map as to the issue of
whether employers should be able to discipline employees for on-duty behavior
discovered via surreptitious technological monitoring. One decision suggests that
surreptitious use of a GPS is generally unwarranted. 168 The employee was terminated
for ―going home without permission on repeated occasions.‖ 169 The employer
verified its suspicion that the off-site employee was not working during working
hours by installing a GPS system in company vehicles of those employees working
off-site without notice to those employees.170 The arbitrator reduced the discipline
because, among other reasons, the employer did not inform the employees of the
installation of the GPS system. 171
A second decision suggests that surreptitious monitoring is appropriate when
there is a known violation, but there is no knowledge of who has engaged in the
violation.172 A hospital employer was faced with a situation where someone was
smoking in violation of hospital policy.173 The employer thus installed a webcam
video device that identified the grievant as the culprit.174 While the arbitrator did not
explicitly address the issue of the employee lacking notice of monitoring, the
arbitrator upheld the grievant‘s discipline.175
A third decision suggests that surreptitious monitoring is generally
unproblematic. 176 The arbitrator implied that ―testimonial or documentary evidence
166

Embarq, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 923, 930-31 (2007) (Armedariz, Arb.).

167

Id. at 932.
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Levinson, supra note 4, at 654.
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Beverage Mktg. Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1388, 1390 (2005) (Fagan, Arb.).

170

Id. at 1391.
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Id. at 1392.
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Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 949 (2006) (Coyne, Arb.).

173

Id. at 953.
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Id. at 950.

175

Id. at 953.
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Levinson, supra note 4, at 655.
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obtained through a nonconsensual search‖ is appropriate ―so long as the methods
employed are not excessively shocking to the conscience of a reasonable person . . .
.‖177 The employer had printouts evidencing that an employee had used a computer
for personal reasons without authorization in violation of a company rule. 178 The
employer set up a camera to take photos of the employee while he was engaged in
the infraction.179 The camera did not photograph the employee misusing the
computer, but the employer asserted it did photograph him viewing pornographic
DVDs.180 The employer discharged him for that behavior and other reasons. The
arbitrator admitted the photos, but held that they were unclear and insufficient to
prove the movie was pornographic rather than the comedy the grievant claimed to
have watched. 181 Because of that and other mitigating factors, the grievant was
reinstated without back pay.182
B.

Privacy in Electronic Communications

Several arbitrators have held that ―e-mails are not private unless employer
policy explicitly affords such protection.‖ 183 In one decision, for example, an
employee sat at his supervisor‘s desk and opened his supervisor‘s e -mail.184 The
arbitrator assumed that the supervisor had no right to privacy in his e-mail.185
Thus, the policy governing an employee‘s computer use is generally quite
important. One arbitrator indicated that he might find a privacy right if management
had told the grievant the e-mail was private. 186 And in another case a union agreed
that use of the company e-mail system, even for representation purposes, was not

Kuhlman Elec. Corp., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 257, 260 n.2 (2006) (Nicholas, Jr., Arb.) (quoting
NORMAN BRAND, DISCIPLINE & DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION 337 (1998)).
177
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Id. at 258.

179

Id.
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Id. at 262.

181

Id.
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Id.
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Levinson, supra note 4, at 661.
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Monterey Co., 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 897, 897 (2002) (Levy, Arb.).
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Id. at 900.
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PPG Indus., Inc., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 833, 839 (1999) (Dichter, Arb.).
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private. The CBA provided that ―[t]he Association and/or its members may use email with no prior approval rights, but no expectation of privacy or security.‖ 187
At least one arbitrator has implied, however, that the default rule is that
employees do have a right to privacy in their electronic communications. 188 An
employee was terminated for accessing files of another employee. The arbitrator
overturned the termination, in part because of the indecent working conditions
under which the employee worked, including monitoring of the employees‘
computer use. 189 One employee testified, ―[w]e were scrutinized completely . . . Our
group was being held to a higher standard than anybody else as far as computer
usage . . . our group was being investigated . . . We referred to it as the Gestapo.‖ 190
Another arbitrator has stated that a supervisor, as opposed to a non-supervisory
employee, has some rights to privacy in his computer files.191
C.

Monitoring On-Duty Communications

Numerous arbitration decisions permit monitoring of electronic
communications even when the employee has no notice of the monitoring, provided
the employer has a reasonable cause to believe a violation of company policy has
taken place and is monitoring for that reason. 192
187

Sycamore Bd. of Educ., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1588, 1589 (2007) (Van Pelt, Arb.).

188

Boeing-Irving Co., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 699, 704 (1999) (Bankston, Arb.).

189

Id. at 703-04.

190

Id. at 702.

191

Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1043, 1050 (2001) (Cohen, Arb.).

See, e.g., Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs, 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 106, 108 (2006) (Hoffman, Arb.)
(supervisor observed grievant repeatedly using computer for non-work related matters and calling
other employees over to view his computer or announcing news to them, and, thus, requested a
review of his Internet use); Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs, 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 300, 306 (2005)
(Petersen, Arb.) (e-mails evidencing a slowdown were discovered when someone alleged harassment
and defamation; the arbitrator reduced the discharge to a written reprimand because that was the
penalty for a slowdown under the employer‘s progressive discipline policy); Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co.,
120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1299, 1302-03 (2005) (Suntrup, Arb.) (investigation after employee posted
hate group poster with listed URL); AE Staley Mfg. Co., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1371, 1375 (2004)
(Nathan, Arb.) (company investigation of one employee led to discovery that another was e-mailing
―hard core‖ pornography); City of Ft. Worth, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1125, 1127 (2007) (Moore, Arb.)
(search of e-mail conducted when one employee reported grievant was assisting another employee in
theft of saw blades); S. Cal. Edison, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1066, 1069 (Prayzich, Arb.) (implying
search of grievant‘s e-mail was performed when co-worker complained about receiving offensive
calendar).
192
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For instance, in one case, the relevant policy permitted ―limited, occasional
or incidental personal, non-business use‖ of the computer, but it prohibited storing
or retrieving discriminatory, offensive, derogatory, obscene, sexual, or defamatory
communications.193 The policy also indicated that the company did not intend to
strictly monitor the computer system, but that it reserved the right to do so. In
particular, the company might do so to ensure an employee‘s use complied with the
law and company policies, or when the company had a business need to monitor. 194
The policy warned that abuse of the policy would subject an employee ―to
disciplinary action without further warning, up to and including discharge . . . .‖ 195 A
co-worker had e-mailed members of the bargaining unit, including the grievant,
warning them not to access pornographic sites because he had been disciplined for
doing so.196 The grievant was, thus, arguably provided notice that infractions were
being disciplined. Human resources instigated an investigation of the grievant‘s
computer use when he posted a hate group‘s poster, complete with a Uniform
Resource Locator (URL) address, on the company bulletin board.197 Human
resources discovered that the grievant had accessed hate sites and pornographic sites
―innumerable times.‖ 198 The arbitrator upheld his termination based on the misuse
of the computer system and additional misconduct. 199
In another case with similar facts, the arbitrator reduced a discharge to
reinstatement after nine months leave with no back pay.200 The employer
investigated the employee‘s e-mail based on a co-worker‘s complaint, and the
investigation of the chain of e-mails led the employer to change the grievant‘s
password to access his e-mail.201 Therein, the employer discovered hard-core
material which had been e-mailed from grievant‘s home computer and to other
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Id. at 1306.

199
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employees and to an employee of an independent contractor.202 The employee
asserted a privacy right under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, but the
arbitrator explicitly determined that there was no violation of the employee‘s privacy
rights.203 The arbitrator reasoned that employees have no expectation of privacy,
even when using an individualized e-mail password, because an employer has a right
to see ―material that would be confidential to others,‖ and the company provides the
computer access to the employee. 204
In another case, a ―chat room‖ operator informed an employer that an
employee had posted a message containing offensive racial language. 205 The
employer conducted an investigation to confirm that the message had originated
from a computer that the grievant used. 206 The arbitrator upheld the grievant‘s
termination.207 And in a third case, one woman complained that she saw a naked
woman on a co-worker‘s screen. The employer then performed an extensive
investigation of a chain of pornographic e-mails and related computer use, resulting
in the grievant‘s discharge, which the arbitrator upheld.208 The arbitrator in another
case made clear, however, that discipline will not be justified when an employer
engages in unnoticed electronic surveillance for which an employer does not have
reasonable cause. 209 In the case, the employer surreptitiously and selectively
videotaped conversations without any evidence of misconduct. 210
D.

Monitoring of Employees Off-Duty Conduct

Closely related to the issue of disciplining employees for off-duty conduct
involving new technologies is the appropriateness of employers monitoring off-duty
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Id. at 841.
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Id. at 838, 845.
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MT Det., 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1777, 1779 (2003) (Allen, Arb.).

206

Id. at 1779.

207

Id. at 1782.
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State of Minn., 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1569, 1573 (2002) (Neigh, Arb.).
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Union-Scioto Local Bd. of Educ., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1071 (2004) (Cohen, Arb.).
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Id. at 1075-76.
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employees. The issue does not yet appear to be a critical issue for many
arbitrators, 211 but there are several relevant cases. 212
In one case, an employee told his supervisor he would be hunting over
Thanksgiving week. 213 When he called in to use FMLA leave during that week with
the excuse that he had to care for his sick wife, the employer hired a private
investigator whose surveillance films revealed the employee loading a truck and
otherwise preparing to go hunting.214 The arbitrator reasoned that surreptitious offduty surveillance based on a reasonable suspicion of misconduct is appropriate when
the surveillance takes place ―outdoors and in the open.‖ 215 Thus, the arbitrator relied
on the film to uphold the employee‘s discharge. 216
In another case, the arbitrator expressed no concern about monitoring
without any reasonable suspicion. An employee used 255.33 hours of Family
Medical Leave Act leave in less than a 12-month period, so the executive vice
president of the employer decided to have an investigative firm conduct surveillance
of the employee‘s activities.217 The vice president decided to terminate the grievant
based on the private investigator‘s report, without reviewing the video that had been
taken.218 The arbitrator concluded that the video of the grievant performing yard
work demonstrated that the grievant ―had an obvious impairment‖ and would have

211

Levinson, supra note 4, at 681.

See e.g., City of Dayton, 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1655 (2008) (Bell, Arb.) In this case, grievant, a
police officer, received pornographic communications on a non-employer issued laptop from another
officer over the employer‘s e-mail system. Id. at 1658. The officer was attempting to one-up the
grievant. Id. The grievance was sustained, and the three-day suspension was reduced to one day
because she had not intended to use the employer‘s property at all to transmit pornography. Id. at
1662. A related issue also likely to continue to grow in salience is use of surveillance by a third party
to prove an employee‘s off-duty misconduct. For instance, in Lincoln Electric System, 125 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 1185, 1190 (2008) (Gaba, Arb.), the employer relied on video taken by Home Depot to
prove that an employee who claimed he was unable to perform light duty work would have been able
to do so.
212
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Interstate Brands Corp., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1580, 1581 (2005) (Skulina, Arb.).
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Bud Indus., Inc., 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 908, 910 (Miles, Arb.).
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been unable to work for all but the last hour and a half of his shift. 219 The arbitrator
overturned the termination. 220

E.

Monitoring Employer’s Property on the Employee’s Property

As advancing technology creates more opportunity for employees to work
away from the workplace, legal issues created by use of employer property away
from the workplace and while at home arise. 221 For instance, one arbitration decision
involved not only first-hand observation but also GPS reports disclosing that an
employer-owned vehicle was parked at an employee‘s home during work time.222
The arbitrator, while reasoning that the first-hand observation carried more weight,
did not preclude the use of the GPS reports at the arbitration hearing. 223 The
arbitrator did, however, reduce the discipline, in part because the GPS system was
installed without notice to the employees. 224
F.

Bargaining Over Employer Technological Monitoring

Another issue that may certainly arise is whether evidence resulting from
technological monitoring over which the union had no opportunity to bargain is
admissible.225 In one case involving a unique fact pattern, the union tried to suppress
photographs captured by an infrared camera (a camera that stores pictures to a
computer) by arguing that the employer had not bargained with the union prior to
installing the camera. 226 The grievant was terminated for unauthorized use of the IT
Room to masturbate. 227 The employer discovered the grievant‘s conduct because the

219

Id. at 914.

220

Id. at 915.

221

Levinson, supra note 4, at 685.

222

Beverage Mktg., Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1388, 1389, 1391 (2005) (Fagan, Arb.).
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Id. at 1389.

224

Id. at 1391-92.

One survey respondent reported involvement in a case challenging the use of a webcam when the
collective bargaining agreement included a provision ―banning management from using cameras
without first advising the‖ union.
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Bluffton Motor Works, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1596, 1599-1600 (2008) (Lalka, Arb.).
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Id. at 1598.
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IT Manager was testing the camera and left it in the IT Room. 228 It was activated by
a movement sensor and taped the grievant‘s conduct. 229 The arbitrator reasoned that
the camera ―was not monitoring employees as they went about their daily tasks in the
workplace. Nor was the camera monitoring employees in the restroom or break
room.‖ 230 Rather because it was in ―a secure area that was off limits to production
employees,‖ the employer could use it without first bargaining with the union. 231
The arbitrator, thus, admitted the recording and held that ―[b]reaking and entering
into an unauthorized area as critical to company operations as its IT Room destroys
all trust a company must have in an employee to continue the employment
relationship.‖232
V.

CASES GRIEVED UNDER PROVISIONS
OTHER THAN JUST CAUSE PROVISION

A number of other issues related to new technology have arisen in contexts
other than a grievance challenging discipline. This section discusses those issues and
some related just cause cases. It addresses the following types of cases: union
requests for negotiation over the impact of technological change; union requests for
extra pay or prohibition of extra duties arising because of advancing technology;
disputes about telecommuting policies; disputes involving employer prohibition of
personal electronic devices on employer property; disputes over whether the
employer or employee should control information stored on employer-issued
computers; and union requests for greater data security.
A.

Impact of Technological Change

Disputes may arise not only over a failure to negotiate about employer
surveillance of employees but also over the impact of technological changes. For
instance, in one case, the union agreed to implementation of a new computerized
system for completing and filing paperwork that had previously been contained in

228

Id. at 1597.
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Id. at 1597-98.

230

Id. at 1600.
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Id.

232

Id. at 1599-1600.
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paper files.233 Thereafter, without negotiating with the union, the employer required
that the documents be entered into the computerized system with document names
required by a newly promulgated ―Naming Convention,‖ and the union grieved such
unilateral implementation. 234 The Convention was designed to address a failure of
the new computerized system—it did not permit creation of subfolders rendering it
difficult to locate documents.235 The arbitrator outlined the relevant provisions of
the governing collective bargaining agreement and the federal statutory law. They
required mid-term bargaining of terms and conditions as well as impact and
implementation bargaining over changes within management‘s right to implement. 236
The arbitrator, however, noted that de minimis changes – those with no real impact –
are exempt from bargaining.237 The arbitrator concluded that ―the impact of the
Naming Convention on working conditions, assuming it was frustrating for some,
has faded with time.‖238 Additionally, it was intended only as a temporary solution to
a problem with the computerized system, and no evidence showed it impacted any
employees‘ performance appraisals. 239 Therefore, the arbitrator denied the grievance,
holding that the employer was not required to bargain with the union before
implementing the Naming Convention.240
B.

Bargaining over Overtime Pay and Off-Duty Availability

In several cases, the issue of pay for the extra work engendered by
technology arose. In one, the employees were hospital anesthesia technicians.241 On
a rotating basis, one of them was required to carry a Spectralink telephone, ―a
portable device that essentially operates in the same fashion as a cellular
telephone.‖242 That person had the responsibility to hand off the Spectralink and
233

Internal Revenue Serv., 126 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 265, 266 (2009) (Abrams, Arb.).
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report on the status of the cases to the designated anesthesia technicians on the next
shift.243 The anesthesia technicians were paid ―additional pay of five percent of base
pay.‖ 244 When a new manager started, the additional pay was discontinued, and the
union filed a grievance. 245 The arbitrator reasoned that the past practice of paying
additional pay ―survived the negotiation of the current agreement and remained in
existence, at least for a short time before repudiation by the Employer.‖ 246 The
arbitrator also reasoned that, based on the testimony, the anesthesia technicians
carrying the phones had an increased workload. The arbitrator ordered the employer
to restore the additional pay and make the employees whole for the loss of wages. 247
In another case, employees, including electricians, high voltage electricians,
plumbers, maintenance mechanic/workers and air conditioning mechanics, were
expected to respond to pages or cell phone calls when off duty. 248 They were only
paid if the call required them to report to work, but were not paid for time spent
giving advice while off-duty.249 The union grieved, seeking payment for the time
spent giving advice when ―on-call‖ but ―off-premise.‖250 The arbitrator reasoned
that the contract was silent and that the past practice was not to pay employees for
providing advice when called to give advice. 251 The arbitrator denied the grievance
stating that ―[y]ou cannot obtain by arbitration that which is lost by way of
negotiation.‖252
In another case, the union protested when the employer unilaterally
implemented a pager policy requiring certain employees to remain available for work
when off-duty.253 The arbitrator held that the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(―CBA‖) prohibited the employer from unilaterally implementing a system under
243
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Id. at 1472.

253
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which all maintenance employees must wear pagers, respond within 15 minutes of
being called, and report to work within one hour. 254 The CBA required that only two
employees of a specified title must remain on call at all times. 255 The arbitrator
reasoned that the new policy infringes employees ―peaceable enjoyment of life and
privacy during self-governed hours.‖ 256 The arbitrator ordered that employees who
had been disciplined for violating the policy must be ―made whole in all respects.‖ 257
C.

Telecommuting

One case nicely illustrates the types of issues that can arise in the boundaryless workplace created by new technologies. The grievant was an inspector whose
duties required him to inspect various sites away from his office.258 The employer
issued him a laptop computer on which he could work and enter his daily diaries
summarizing his activities.259 He was assigned to an office in the east of his work
area, and no policy dictated when or how often inspectors should be at the assigned
office.260 The grievant‘s prior supervisor indicated that he could do paperwork at his
home, which was in the south of his designated area.261 The grievant understood
that he was permitted to work from home whenever it was beneficial to his employer
and did so for four years. 262 The grievant‘s prior supervisor stated, in an e-mail
presented at the hearing, that he assigned employees to work close to their homes to
save fuel and time. The grievant did not inform his new supervisor of the
arrangement, assuming it was common knowledge. 263 When contractors complained
that they had trouble reaching the grievant, the employer hired a private investigator
to monitor his activities for 16 days.264 The reports disclosed that he was at his home
254

Id. at 364-65.
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during various times of the work day, and the reports identified that the grievant
stopped briefly three times at his mother-in-law‘s home. 265 The grievant had asked
permission of his supervisor to check on a roofing job at his mother-in-law‘s home,
and he did not think it was necessary to seek permission anew on each particular day
he stopped there.266 The grievant was disciplined for falsifying time sheets and
telecommuting without an official telecommuting plan. 267 He was suspended for
three days.268
As to stopping at his mother-in-law‘s house, the arbitrator ruled that he had
the appropriate permission to do so and was not required to record each stop as a
break in light of the independence with which he worked.269 As to the charge of
working at home in violation of official policy and without his supervisor‘s
knowledge, the arbitrator reasoned that the grievant did have the permission of his
prior supervisor to work at home whenever the job site was closer to his home than
to his assigned office.270 The arbitrator further reasoned that the grievant did not
know that a formal policy was required for telecommuting. 271 The arbitrator,
nevertheless, found that two of the three jobs to which the grievant was assigned
during the relevant time period were closer to the assigned office than to grievant‘s
home, and, thus, he should not have been working as much as he was at home. 272
The arbitrator concluded that ―his laxity in following the limitations in [his prior
supervisor‘s] instructions was a product of the independence he had been granted,
and did not stem from ‗willful disobedience.‘‖273 The arbitrator reduced the
suspension to a written warning. 274
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Prohibiting Personal Electronic Devices on Employer’s Property

Several cases have addressed the issue of whether employers can prohibit
carrying or using personal electronic devices, particularly cell phones, and whether
employers can discipline employees accordingly. 275
For example, in one case, the employer employed truckers who had a
communication device installed in their company-issued trucks where dispatch could
contact them in the event of an emergency. 276 The employer issued a policy
prohibiting carrying cell phone and other personal communication devices.277 The
union filed a grievance protesting the policy and requesting permission for the
truckers to carry cell phones for emergency use only. 278 The CBA explicitly granted
the employer the right to ―adopt reasonable safety and work rules not inconsistent‖
with the CBA.279 The arbitrator upheld the prohibition, reasoning that prohibiting
use of cell phones while on duty is reasonable for myriad reasons, including safety
and image conveyed to customers. 280 The arbitrator further reasoned that a complete
ban on carrying cell phones is a reasonable method of enforcement for several
reasons. The employees work away from the company, and cell phone use cannot
be easily monitored.281 The employer had also tried using a rule prohibiting cell
phone use, but it had not worked well.282 Moreover, rarely would there be an
emergency when the communication device installed in the truck had also failed. 283
The arbitrator also considered the reality that the employer had granted several
employees, such as those with a pregnant wife in the last trimester or an ill family
member, permission to carry a cell phone for a certain time period. 284
See e.g., Winston-Salem Transit, 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1185 (2006) (Bendixsen, Arb.)
(employer failed to prove that bus operator had made a non-business related cell phone call while
operating a bus).
275
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Several cases challenging just cause for termination in a prison setting also
uphold the reasonableness of a rule prohibiting cell phones on the premises.285 In
one, a corrections officer was subject to a last chance agreement. 286 A rule
prohibited bringing cell phones into the jail. 287 The officer was terminated for
refusing to hand over his cell phone, which he had in a work area, to a supervisor. 288
The arbitrator upheld the termination, reasoning that the grievant‘s conduct in
refusing to hand over the phone was ―contrary to the well accepted ‗obey now-grieve
later‘ doctrine.‖289
In another case, an employee was discharged for use of a cell phone, among
other things.290 The employer manufactured products requiring the use of flammable
chemicals, and it placed great weight on safety.291 The safety rules included one
prohibiting ―the use of cell phones while operating a forklift.‖ 292 Management
observed the grievant using his cell phone while operating the forklift and shortly
thereafter, outside of the forklift, during a non-break time.293 The grievant received a
phone call from his son‘s mother while in the forklift and told her he would call her
right back. 294 He terminated the call, left the forklift, and called her back because his
son had been suspended from school and his mother lived in a different state,
necessitating his attention to the problem. 295 The plant practice was to permit
employees to use cell phones outside of the working area, even during non-break
times.296 The arbitrator upheld the grievance, reasoning that the grievant was singled

See e.g., V.I. Dep‘t of Justice, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 626, 632 (Henner, Arb.) (2008). (―The fact
is still that the Grievant violated general conduct rules in providing a cell phone to an inmate, and
then lying about that fact.‖).
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out for discipline, including the discipline for the brief phone call in the forklift. 297
The arbitrator further reasoned that the practice was to permit the use of cell phones
in ―safe areas‖ and that the son‘s difficulties provided a legitimate reason for the
grievant to use the phone. 298
On the other hand, one case dealing with use of private property while on
break but at the workplace upholds an employer‘s right to discipline an employee for
use of such technology in violation of employer rules. 299 The employee used his cell
phone to take photographs of the sunset during his break period while in a smoking
area.300 Taking photos violated an employer rule prohibiting the use of recording
devices on plant property.301 The employer, thus, requested that the employee
disclose the photos on his phone.302 When the employee refused, the employer
discharged him.303
E.

Control of Information Stored on the Computer

Several cases raise the issue of whether the employer or the employee should
have control over information stored on an employer-issued computer. In one case
an employee was terminated for installing and failing to remove a password that
prohibited management from using the computer. 304 The arbitrator concluded that
the company owned the computers and had a management right to prohibit
installation of such passwords. 305
In another case, the union proposed during negotiations that employees
perform routine maintenance on assigned computers. But the interest arbitrator
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Id. at 967 (the grievant was, however, reinstated because the employer had not provided adequate
notice of the policy prohibiting personal passwords).
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chose the employer‘s proposal that the computers be sent to an appropriate location
for the employer to perform the necessary maintenance.306
F.

Data Security

One issue often raised by new technologies is that of confidentiality and
security of personal information. While the issue has not yet frequently arisen in the
arbitration decisions, at least one case raises the issue. 307 The employer hired an
accounting firm to perform a financial audit, and two laptop computers containing
the names and social security numbers of the unit members were stolen from the
accounting firm.308 The employer did not possess or operate these computers. The
computers were, however, stolen from the employer‘s headquarters. 309 The
employer provided the grievants ―with credit protection via Internet and mail with
three recognized credit bureaus for a period of 12 to 24 months with an option to
renew, automatic fraud alert on credit files, and $20,000 in identify theft
insurance.‖ 310 The union grieved under the contract clause requiring health and
safety of the employees, seeking greater credit protection and identity theft insurance
and implementation of a policy to adequately secure employees‘ confidential
information.311 The arbitrator held that while the issue was an important one, he
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the provision requiring health and safety
could not be read to extend to securing confidential employee information.312
VI.

CONCLUSION

New technologies in the workplace give rise to disputes about blurred
boundaries between work and private life and the ease of dissemination of
confidential and proprietary information. They arguably increase the likelihood that
employees will engage in non-work and inappropriate activity at the workplace
during work time and increase the ease with which employers can monitor
306
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employees‘ private lives. This article surveys arbitration decisions dealing with such
disputes. It describes cases where employees grieved discipline for allegedly
inappropriate conduct involving technology as without just cause. It discusses
arbitrators‘ approaches to insuring appropriate safeguards are in place when
employers technologically monitor their employees. And it highlights some of the
issues involving new technology that unions desire to bargain over, such as policies
prohibiting carrying or use of personal devices on employer property, additional pay
for or prohibition of requirements to remain on-call while off-duty, and data security
for employees‘ personal information.
Most of the non-union private sector moves along with no comprehensive
law governing the introduction of new technology into the workplace. In the union
setting, however, arbitrators are using age-old principles, like just cause and unilateral
change, to systematically grapple with the difficult issues raised by new technology.
The arbitrators follow contract provisions and past precedents. But they also lead us
forward toward the long-term goal of finding an appropriate accommodation of the
interests of employers and employees.
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Appendix
Initial Report
Last Modified: 12/30/2009

33. Have you been involved in any grievances or arbitrations (labor or employment)
about the use of any modern technology such as pagers, GPS, electronic mail,
Internet, cell phones or handheld instruments, blogs, Twitter or social networking
sites?
# Answer
1
2

Response

%

Yes
No

18
16

53%
47%

Total

34

100%

Statistic
Mean

Value
1.47

Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

0.26
0.51
34

34. What technology was involved?
Text Response
Computer
Emails
electronic imaging
GPS
Internet websites and email
e-mail
email and recordings, dash board cameras
smart phone
camera on a computer
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desk top computer - internet
Employer-provided e-mail
GPS, social networking, email, blogging

Statistic
Total Responses

Value
12

35. What was the issue or what were the issues?
Text Response

alleged misuse by accessing pornography or making Google queries with sexually
explicit words and phrases
Union requested hard copies of relevant e-mails
Did the grievant, a truck driver, deviate from his route?
Inappropriate access, sexual harassment, proof of romantic relationship undermining
credibility of supporting witness, proof of many elements in discrimination and
employment contract cases.
Just cause was the issue. The particular question with regard to technology was
whether the grievant's use of the (school system) e-mail to solicit comments about
the employer was protected speech under Ohio law.
almost all cases have some form of email issues. Most Police cases have radio, dash
board camera and tape recording. Admission, is a common issue
termination
Whether the employee was discharged for just cause for viewing porno sites during
working time when no supervision was in the plant.
Case 1: Discharge for accessing porn Case 2: Same
Monitoring by P's first-line manager of e-mail content.
various

Statistic
Total Responses

Value
11
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36. What provision or provisions of the collective bargaining agreement were relied
on by the claimant?
Text Response

arbitration clause
Just cause.
just cause
The CBA provided that union members could ―use e-mail with no prior approval
rights, but no expectation of privacy or security.‖ Under Ohio law - mirroring
Section 7 of the NLRA - use of Er e-mail systems, when permitted by the employer,
constitutes a concerted activity.
None
alleged that termination violated the "just cause" standard in the cba
Provision banning management from using cameras without first advising the Union.
Just cause discharge standard
N/A
just cause, privacy

Statistic

Value

Total Responses

10

38. What was the outcome?
Text Response

ULP for failure to allow employee to have requested representative during
interrogation by Air Force Office of Special Investigation
Arbitrator held that Company had to provide the Union the hard copies of the emails.
Discipline upheld
Various
defense award
Grievant prevailed.
Case 1: Union withdrew grievance. Case 2: pending
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Ongoing
various

Statistic

Total Responses

Value

9
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